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People are obsessed with religion: The definitional dissonance of evangelical 




This article responds to recent calls to consider how religion is defined and deployed 
in and about Myanmar. Discussing local Pentecostal efforts to evangelise to 
Buddhists in contemporary Yangon, it presents the encounter with the religious other 
as one ground from which definitions of religion might emerge. I show that, by taking 
up new opportunities to share the gospel, believers enter into a long conversation 
between Christianity and Buddhism dating back to the colonial period. Tracing the 
different definitions of religion that this conversation generates, and attuning to the 
dissonances between them, might offer alternate ways for approaching what gets 





To observe Myanmar’s recent history is to be reminded that definitions are far from 
neutral. Who gets to define a concept is a question frequently caught up with 
workings of power unfolding across domains of law, politics, and religion. Indeed, the 
extent to which the meanings of those very categories in Myanmar have been and are 
subject to contestation – alongside democracy, citizenship, and indigeneity – speaks 
to the force of definitions to afford certain possibilities and foreclose others. There are 
clues to this force in the etymology of ‘definition’ itself, in the bounding and limiting 
actions implied by the Latin ‘finire’. For its part, the Burmese word for definition (a-
dei-pe) has in its Pali root the sense not just of ‘sense’, but also of ‘purpose’: a 
reminder, perhaps, of the intentions and tensions at play in processes and practices of 
definition.   
 
One person unlikely to need such a reminder was the senior pastor at Hope, an 
independent Pentecostal church in downtown Yangon.1 Founded in the 1980s, Hope 
was recognised in Pentecostal circles for its commitment to evangelism, its dedication 
to sharing the gospel with non-believers. Roughly two thirds of its staff were 
employed as evangelists. This meant regular excursions to neighbourhoods on 
Yangon’s peri-urban fringe to speak about Jesus to Buddhist households. I was 
discussing this work with the pastor one afternoon in early 2016 when there was a 
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knock on his glass office door. One of the church ministers entered and handed him a 
small pink post-it note with a number written on it: the latest figure for total members 
of his church. The pastor had been explaining how, thirty years earlier, God had given 
him a vision to travel from Chin State, in the west of the country, to Yangon to found 
a church that would ‘shake Myanmar for Christ’. The post-it note spoke to the 
realisation of that vision, evincing how baptisms the previous weekend of a batch of 
‘new believers’ (youn chi thu athiq) had increased church membership by about a 
dozen.  
 
What impact, I asked, did the new conversion law have on this work? Introduced 
about six months earlier as part of a package of four ‘Protection of Race and Religion 
Laws’, this was to establish ‘Religious Conversion Scrutinising and Registration 
Boards’ at the local township level to which any person wanting to change their 
religion would need to present. The pastor claimed to be unfazed. Christians 
continued to face persecution, he said, notwithstanding the reforms that since around 
2011 had allowed them to evangelise more publically. But they would continue 
irrespective of the law. For one thing, it was not really about them; passed at the 
behest of Buddhist nationalist groups, its real target was Myanmar’s Muslims. It was 
also not yet clear, as is frequently the case in the country, how the law would be 
implemented. That really came down to local township officers. Most importantly 
though, it was a lot like the system of national ID cards: whether a person had 
‘Buddhist’ or ‘Christian’ or ‘Muslim’ listed on the card as their religion was beside 
the point. What mattered was what they ‘believed’ (youn deh) in their ‘heart’ (seik 
hna’loun). After all, the pastor said, his church was not doing ‘religion’ (batha).  
 
We might dismiss this as the performance of a familiar evangelical trope: the 
assertion that Christianity offers something radically different from mere ‘religion’.2 
This was certainly a constant refrain in Yangon churches during the fieldwork on 
which this paper is based, conducted over 18 months between 2014 and 2016. We 
might also read in the pastor’s remark the familiar Protestant emphasis on interiority 
and the sincerity of personal conviction.3 In this paper, however, I situate the pastor’s 
claim – his insistence that his church is not doing ‘religion’ – in relation to the work 
the concept performs in Myanmar. In doing so, I respond to recent calls to attend to 
how certain key categories – such as religion and politics – are used in discourse both 
in and about the country, especially in the growing body of analysis seeking to 
understand certain trends and events – rising nationalism, outbreaks of communal 
violence, episodes of ethnic cleansing – that have accompanied the country’s apparent 
transition.4 Much of this analysis, in an echo of debates surrounding the Arab Spring,5 
																																																								
2 Gil Anidjar, ‘Secularism’, Critical Inquiry, 31, 1 (2006): 52–77.  
3 Webb Keane Christian moderns: Freedom and fetish in the mission encounter 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).  
4 Alicia Turner, ‘Myanmar: Contesting conceptual landscapes in the politics of 
Buddhism’, Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia, 16 (2016), https://kyotoreview.org/issue-
19/myanmar-buddhism-conceptual-landscapes/. Accessed: 27 May 2018; Nick 
Cheesman, ‘Introduction: Interpreting communal violence in Myanmar’, Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, 47, 3 (2017): 335-352; Iselin Frydenlund, ‘Protecting the sasana 
through law: Radical Buddhism and religious freedom in transitional Myanmar”, in 
Religion, secularism and democracy in Southeast Asia, ed. Vidhu Verma 
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 194-212 
	 3	
revolves around the issue of religion and its relationship to what is often glossed as 
the secular. The risk, however, as Alicia Turner reminds us, is that such terms come to 
be treated as fixed and neutral categories, thereby eliding Burmese moves ‘to redefine 
or reshape the conceptual landscape in the local context’.6 Unpacking the pastor’s 
claim that his church is not doing religion offers a possible window onto how some of 
this definitional labour is performed.  
 
The concern with where to draw the line between religion and the secular – or 
between religion and politics, or religion and the state – is not new to studies of 
Myanmar. An earlier generation of scholars working after independence were also 
concerned with how these categories were demarcated, and what apparent slippages 
between them meant for the country’s postcolonial future.7 The focus, in other words, 
is on the relationship between categories, ignoring ‘the processes and practices by 
which the essences of the secular and the religious are continually defined and 
redefined.’8 Turner’s suggestion to attend to how ordinary Buddhists engage in the 
ongoing ‘definition and redefinition of constitutive categories in Burmese life’ is thus 
both urgent and long overdue.9 Hayward and Frydenlund’s make a similar call to 
consider the ‘Burmese Buddhist point of view’ in understanding the place of the 
secular in Myanmar’s legal arrangements.10 Also needed, however, is a recognition 
that the field of definitional labour is not an exclusively Buddhist space. It is one 
where religious others are active participants in its politics, not just mere objects of it. 
This article is therefore a response to provocations such as Turner’s, but from an 
oblique angle, focusing not on Buddhists, but on local Pentecostals whose evangelism 
draws them onto this terrain. To take this approach is to recognise that defining 
religion ‘is not merely an abstract intellectual exercise’, but rather one that compels us 
to ask ‘questions about where, by whom, and in what manner – i.e. in what social 
context and in what spirit – the definitions are produced and put into circulation.’11  
 
Evangelists in Myanmar encounter definitions of religion already in circulation, even 
as they try to mobilise their own. Noteworthy is that these definitions are inflected 
with histories of past Christian-Buddhist encounter, inflections that have an 
ambiguous bearing on contemporary exchanges. For if the category of religion 
emerged in Burma, at least in part, in the course of the colonial encounter, and if this 
encounter, largely through the work of foreign missionaries, entwined religion with 
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belief,12 today’s evangelists work to disentangle the two. Their message is often that 
‘religion’ (batha) and ‘belief’ (youn chi chin) are not at all the same. If 
religion/politics is the binary on which much analysis of Myanmar pivots, 
religion/belief is the opposition that principally concerned evangelists at Hope and 
similar churches. It is with the apparent goal of rendering the latter distinction legible 
to Buddhist audiences that much energy is spent. The role of Protestant missionaries 
in the production of a category of religion grounded in belief is a familiar story across 
histories of colonialism. It is now axiomatic not just that the secular and religious are 
mutually constitutive categories, but that we can trace Christian geneaologies in 
definitions of religion – and attendant formations of the secular – across postcolonial 
settings.13 This axiom is borne out in Myanmar too, as we will see in what follows. 
But we will also see how today’s evangelists work at cross-purposes with these 
legacies, evading the categories they have generated and loosening some of their hold.  
 
In approaching these moves, it might be helpful to think about contemporary 
evangelism as the latest exchange in a ‘long conversation’ between Buddhism and 
Christianity in Myanmar – similar to what the Comaroffs observe in their study of the 
encounter between the Tswana and British missionaries in southern Africa.14 Doing 
so reveals how two centuries of Christian-Buddhist encounter have helped to shape 
how religion is lived and understood in Myanmar. But what it also shows is the extent 
to which this conversation has and continues to be shot through with definitional 
dissonances: slippages in the meanings of its key terms in their passage between 
different groups, and also between past and present. I suggest that these dissonances 
might be productive, though not necesarrily in aiding evangelism; the gospel has long 
received a mostly indifferent reaction from Buddhist audiences in Myanmar, and, the 
pink post-it note notwithstanding, there is no overwhelming evidence to suggest this 
has changed of late.  
 
Rather, dissonances might be productive in two other ways. First, they afford space 
through which efforts to preach the gospel can exist at cross-purposes with state 
efforts to regulate religious difference. They are what allow Hope’s senior pastor, for 
example, to pay attention to the post-it note while dismissing the conversion law – 
assenting to belief’s registration in one mode but not the other. Second, they provide a 
conceptual armature through which the karmic logic of Buddhism comes to stand as a 
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quintessential ‘religion’ when contrasted with the gospel that claims to transcend it. 
The first might involve a rejection of certain constituent elements of secularism, 
insofar as its modes of governance entail not just the privatisation of faith, but also the 
state’s production and management of religious difference.15 The second might entail 
the rejection of secularity in the form of karma perceived as a disenchanted law of 
causality. Both suggest that attuning to definitional dissonances might point to 
alternate conceptual frames in use. Such dissonances were amplified amidst the 
country’s fraught transition – a moment in which, for Christians at churches like 
Hope, God was finally ‘saving’ Myanmar. It is to this moment that we now turn.  




For the Pentecostal believers with whom I did fieldwork, the transition offered 
opportunities and challenges. The effects of recent political and economic changes 
were keenly felt, even if attitudes towards them remained ambivalent: new shopping 
malls springing up; the surge in smartphone use; the easing of censorship; the 
liberalisation of party politics leading to the NLD’s electoral victory. These were the 
signs that ‘God is moving in Myanmar’. But they were accompanied by rising costs of 
living, ongoing efforts to silence certain forms of dissent, and a growing scepticism 
about the NLD’s ability to deliver the ‘real change’ it had promised its diverse 
constituents – especially, but not only, given constitutional constraints that continued 
to enshrine the military’s role in civilian government. Like their Buddhist 
compatriots, Pentecostals wrestled with these contradictions. They too greeted the 
NLD’s victory with enthusiasm, even as they were circumspect about whether it 
would have any substantive impact on their lives. In conversations in churches about 
the transition, an increasing degree of cynicism – a feeling that nothing was 
changing – was tempered by the acknowledgement that some things were in fact 
different. If the former was down to the recalcitrance of generals and their cronies, the 
latter was largely attributed to God.  
 
One change these Christians pointed to was a greater freedom to organise large public 
gatherings. In the past, I was told, requests to hold such events were frequently 
denied, part of a program of persecution that also included the random closure of 
churches. Even the biggest cynics were willing to admit that, on this front at least, 
things had improved. Recent years had seen a burgeoning of public concerts and 
conferences held on a scale and with a frequency previously unimaginable. The 
English names of many – ‘Awakening’, ‘History Maker’, ‘True Transformation’ –
seemed not only to speak to the familiar evangelical emphasis on rupture, but also to 
index the reforms that had only recently made their organisation possible. Such 
linguistic moves rendered democratisation in the language of conversion, intertwined 
personal and political salvation, and implied that the country itself was, perhaps, on 
the precipice of being ‘born again’.  
 
This is not to say that local Christians were not pursuing evangelism prior to the start 
of the transition around 2011. Friends often reminded me of heroic steps taken even in 
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the face of government persecution. According to some, the persecution in fact helped 
spark a ‘revival’ amongst local Christians who carried the burden of sharing the 
gospel with their Buddhist compatriots – especially after foreign missionaries were 
expelled in 1966, four years after Ne Win’s coup. This weight was borne largely by 
members of those ethnic minorities most receptive to Christianity in the decades and 
centuries following the arrival in Rangoon of Adoniram Judson, the famous American 
Baptist missionary, in 1813.16 Today, many Pentecostal churches in Yangon trace 
roots back to a Pentecostal revival that swept through the northern part of Chin State, 
especially around the town of Tedim, in the early 1970s.17  
 
American Baptist missionaries had worked successfully in the Chin Hills, a 
mountainous region where the Buddhism of lowland states had made few inroads, 
since the turn of the twentieth century. But the revival – replete with reports of 
healings, prophecies, and other miracles – prompted an exodus of believers from 
mainline to charismatic churches. As large numbers of people from this region 
migrated down to Yangon over subsequent decades, they brought this new faith, with 
its emphasis on the experience of the Holy Spirit and its commitment to evangelism, 
to Myanmar’s largest city. Churches such as Hope emerge largely out of this history, 
meaning that contemporary evangelism in Yangon is not only an exchange in a 
extended dialogue between Christianity and Buddhism; it can also be situated in terms 
of a long series of different kinds of interactions between people from Myanmar’s 
geographic and cultural periphery and those from its centre.18  
 
My friend Sangpi’s story was fairly representative in this respect. He was 28 years 
old, and had been born in Tedim and raised in Kalaymyo, a city in Sagaing Division 
and the foot of the Chin Hills. After studying at a bible college in Singapore, he had 
returned to Myanmar and now lived in Yangon, where he was an active participant in 
Christian events. One of these that I attended was in April 2016, when two of 
Myanmar’s most prominent preachers, David Lah and San Toe, were given 
permission to hold an outdoor revival meeting at People’s Park, in the shadow of the 
Shwedagon Pagoda (Figure 1). For Christians still sceptical about whether the 
transition had led to any concrete change, this event would have left them in little 
doubt. The previous October, the NLD’s request to hold a campaign rally at the 
location had been denied; now, just seven months later, believers could meet there in 
large numbers to worship Jesus. That they could so in such close vicinity to the 
pagoda – a site whose potency in Burmese Buddhism is matched only by its central 
role in the country’s colonial and postcolonial history19 – was not lost on attendees, 
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about three thousand of whom turned out over three nights during the first heavy rains 
of the wet season.  
 
Packed under an enormous tent, they listened to sermons by the preachers, and sang 
along to rousing worship songs with Christian rock stars and rappers like Myo Gyi 
and J-Me. Sangpi was there to volunteer as the head usher. He told me, in a rare 
moment when not dashing around in the rain to organise overflow seating, that the 
event was only possible because Myanmar was now ‘open’ after decades of being 
‘closed’. The majority of the audience were Christian, he said, but the preaching and 
music would also touch the hearts of non-believers. He gestured to the small crowd of 
curious families and teenagers milling about the entrance on their way to the Happy 
Zone amusement park next door. It was a sentiment shared by David Lah when I 
interviewed two months later. ‘As you saw in People’s Park, it’s possible!’ he said. 




Figure 1: Signboard advertising event with preachers David Lah and San Toe at 
People’s Park, Yangon, 2016. Photo by author.  
 
 
How far, exactly, had God opened the door? Events like this gave some Christians the 
confidence to evangelise in ways more visible and audible than they had previously 
dared. Doing so entailed entering into a tentatively more open public sphere. But it 
was one over which the legacies of censorship and surveillance continued to loom 
large, and in which the voices of Buddhist nationalists were amplified amidst political 
and economic change, even as they also articulated longer standing currents.20 While 
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Muslims had been the primary focus 969, MaBaTha and likeminded actors, this didn’t 
stop some Christians from worrying about what the ascendancy of such groups meant 
for them. For those committed to evangelism, a careful balancing act was required. 
‘We need to be shrewd as snakes and innocent as doves,’ was how Hope’s senior 
pastor put it, with reference to Matthew 10:16, when we met in his office. He went on 
to stress that, while it behoved Christians to seize new opportunities for evangelism, 
there was no need to ‘advertise’ whatever success they might have.  
 
He gave the example of national registration cards, which, in Myanmar, list both a 
person’s ‘religion’ (batha) and their ‘ethnicity’ (lumyo).21 A convert had little to gain, 
the pastor felt, from seeking to have their new faith recorded on their registration 
card. This would be more trouble than it was worth, not least because of the tendency 
in Myanmar to jumble the categories of religion and ethnicity, meaning that 
conversion raised the possibility of paradox. It made sense for a person to be ‘Chin’ 
and ‘Christian’, or alternatively, ‘Bamar’ and ‘Buddhist’. But how could a person be 
‘Bamar’ and ‘Christian’? Such terms were considered mutually exclusive, especially 
in the eyes of the local bureaucrats responsible for administering the system of 
registration cards. There was also the risk that too many converts seeking to amend 
their cards might draw unhelpful attention to the church. What mattered, again, was 
what a person believed in their heart, a space inaccessible to the gaze of state officials. 
Only God could access this space, could know the sincerity of a person’s belief, the 
extent to which they had accepted Jesus into their life – all of which made the new 
conversion law both irrelevant and ridiculous in the eyes of the pastor. How could the 
Religious Conversion Scrutinising and Registration Boards it established possibly be 
expected to make that determination? 
 
Yet the pink post-it note suggested that interiority was not the end of the story. State 
tools of registration, such as the ID card, were to be avoided; there was little benefit 
from trying to render one’s faith legible via these mechanisms. Still, some form of 
external registration clearly still mattered for churches such as Hope, and not just in 
the eyes of God. New believers had their numbers counted. Photographs of their 
baptisms lined the walls at Hope. Their testimonies were printed in the pages of the 
church newsletter compiled by the pastor’s nephew. Posting on Facebook about a 
revival event he’d helped organise in 2016, one friend wrote, in English, ‘Salvations 
200+’. In these ways, Christians registered the changes that new believers were 
thought to have undergone, a registering that also gestured towards the wider context 
of transition in which they occurred. That they did so whilst evading state attempts to 
register religious change speaks not only to their desire, in a still uncertain moment, to 
seek certain forms of recognition while avoiding others. It also gets at the question of 
what exactly is being registered. For if the ID card or conversion law profess to record 
a person’s religion, what these Christians claim to be recording is a person’s belief – 
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two categories they present as not only different but opposite. We attune to the 
resulting dissonances in the following discussion of the conversion law and its 
conceptual genealogy. 
 
Bureaucratising belief  
 
The law stipulated that people seeking to convert needed to apply to one of the new 
Religious Conversion Scrutinising and Registration Boards for permission to do so. 
Applicants were to submit a range of details including their age, address, and 
registration card number. They were also expected to provide the board with their 
‘reason for converting to the new religion’. The boards would interview applicants to 
determine whether they were converting voluntarily. They could order the person to 
pursue further study of their new religion before deciding whether to issue them with 
a certificate recognising the conversion. Given these baroque prescriptions, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that human rights groups considered the law discriminatory, that 
many Christians found it absurd, and that none of the converts I met had any interest 
in submitting themselves to the onerous procedure it instituted. More surprising, 
perhaps, is the seemingly innocuous section on the first page of the written version of 
the law that defines its key terms, particularly the way it defines ‘religion’ – that is, as 
‘a system of belief (youn chi) subscribed to by a person.’22 
 
What to make of the fact that religion is defined here in this way? ‘Through 
complicated patterns of influence,’ writes Donald Lopez, ‘the representatives of non-
Christian religions have come to speak of themselves in terms of belief.’23 This is part 
of a now familiar story about the complex role that colonial governance, missionary 
activity, and the comparative study of religion have played in establishing and 
demarcating the category of religion around the world. It is a story about the 
implications of the West’s ‘conceptual geology’ for the ‘ways in which non-Western 
traditions are now able to grow and change.’24 Scholars drilling down into this 
geology in the Burmese context have argued that no clear term for ‘religion’ existed 
in the Burmese language prior to the colonial period. The words for ‘religion’ (batha) 
and ‘Buddhism’ (bok’da batha), they suggest, emerge in this context. The word batha 
had previously been used to refer to language and is still also used this way today. 
What did exist prior to British arrival was the concept of thathanadaw: a polity 
structured around the Buddha’s dispensation or sasana (thathana in Burmese) and 
organised around a set of relations between the monarchy, monks, and laity.25 
Kirichenko shows that Burmese words for ‘religion’ and ‘Buddhism’ only appeared 
after significant contacts with the West. ‘These equivalents derived from the work of 
Christian missionaries,’ he suggests, ‘who needed them to translate texts and sermons 
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in the Burmese vernacular.’ 26  One theory has it that it was Judson who was 
responsible for introducing the word ‘Buddhism’ into Burmese, though doubts remain 
that any one person could have done so singlehandedly.27  
 
In any event, the evidence suggests that at least one force behind the emergence of 
these categories in Burma was Christian evangelism and the Buddhist response – an 
encounter in which tracts criticising or defending Buddhism ‘helped to domesticate 
new terms’.28 Both Houtman and Kirichenko tell us that the term bok’da batha only 
entered widespread use in the late nineteenth century. One key difference that 
Kirichenko highlights between thathanadaw and batha is a newfound emphasis on 
belief: ‘thathanadaw and belonging to it was understood as a number of observances 
and realisations, not as a set of doctrines or beliefs … precolonial texts defining 
model followers of the teaching generally spoke of things to do, not of postulates to 
believe in or hold as a view.’29 One person thought to have played a key role in 
popularising the new term and placing belief at its centre was the influential monk 
Ledi Sayadaw (1846-1923). In writings that were often a rejoinder to missionary 
critiques of Buddhism, he came to speak about Buddhism (bok’da batha) as 
‘quintessentially a system of beliefs’ comparable to, and in competition with, other 
religions.30   
 
This is not to suggest that batha came to replace thathana wholesale. On the contrary, 
the category of thathana remained not only operational under colonialism, but was 
mobilised in the course of resistance to it.31 Today, although MaBaTha’s official 
English title is the Patriotic Association of Myanmar, its full name in Burmese attests 
to the organisation’s claim to protect both batha and thathana.32 In his study of the 
Shwegyin monastic order, Carbine speaks of a process of ‘sasana-isation’ whereby 
the figure of thathana came to be increasingly central to Burmese Buddhist life, even 
as the range of meaning associated with the term remained large.33 All the same, what 
this brief historical detour indicates is how an earlier set of exchanges in a long 
conversation between Christianity and Buddhism contributed to shaping a category of 
‘religion’ now circulating in Myanmar, one that appears on people’s national 
registration cards and is manifest in the language and logic of the new conversion law 
– a further reminder that the effects of missionary projects cannot be measured by 
numbers of converts alone.34  
 
Like the Tswana encounter with British missionaries on the South African frontier, 
Burmese Buddhists were drawn onto a Christian conceptual terrain, even as they 
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challenged Christianity and argued for the superiority of Buddhism. 35  For the 
Comaroffs, such moves facilitated the constitution of hegemony through a set of 
everyday discursive and material processes they term the ‘colonisation of 
consciousness’. Today’s evangelists in Myanmar navigate a conceptual terrain partly 
shaped by the nineteenth-century missionaries to whom they are heirs of a sort. In 
doing so, however, they often ignore or evade the categories those earlier encounters 
helped usher into being. When Hope’s senior pastor dismisses the conversion law or 
advises converts against amending their registration cards, he challenges the 
conflation of religion and belief that scholars have attributed partly to his missionary 
predecessors. The result is that evangelism becomes an encounter shot through with 
dissonances: gaps between different definitions of religion that afford certain 
possibilities to those who pass through them.  
 
Consider what my friend May Lwin told me over lunch at the Dagon Centre 2 
shopping mall one month after the NLD’s election win. Though her registration card 
still stated she was ‘Buddhist’, she was, in fact, one of the most active members of 
another Pentecostal church in downtown Yangon loosely affiliated with Hope. Run by 
Chin pastors, with worship conducted in both Burmese and English, the church 
attracted a mix of attendees that included foreign NGO staff and volunteers. May 
Lwin stayed at a friend’s apartment on weekends so she wouldn't miss services. Her 
family had once lived nearby but had been forced by rising rents to move from the 
centre to Hlegu, a small township about 40kms to the northeast. Now 24, she told me 
she had become a believer at 19, when still a physics student at Dagon University. A 
friend had invited her to a free English class at the church where a volunteer from 
Argentina encouraged her to read the bible. ‘I’m a Buddhist,’ she had initially 
responded, ‘so I’m really not interested.’ The teacher was persistent, but so was May 
Lwin. ‘Whenever she would speak about Jesus, I would speak about the Buddha.’ 
However, over time, and though regular conversations with the Argentinian, she 
began, she said, to experience Christ’s presence in her life, and also to ask herself a 
question that would eventually lead her to him: Was she satisfied with travelling 
through countless cycles of samsara, unsure about the outcome, especially when Jesus 
offered her certainty about what to expect in her next life? This was a question, she 
felt, few Buddhists seriously asked themselves. Buddhism, for many, was just 
‘tradition’ (miyopola).   
 
She was planning to look into amending her registration card when it next came up 
for renewal, notwithstanding the fact that, with ‘Bamar’ listed as her ethnicity, this 
was likely to be difficult. Still, her faith was also not something she was keen to 
announce to an audience of local bureaucrats. ‘Why should they have anything to do 
with my belief?’ she asked. ‘I don't like it when people say that I have changed my 
religion,’ she told me several months later. ‘It’s just that I started believing. People 
here are obsessed with religion.’  
 
The distinction she made here did not imply some syncretic move, some desire to 
reconcile her new faith in Jesus with a broader field of Buddhist practice. On the 
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contrary, becoming a believer for May Lwin meant no longer participating in a set of 
practices she and other believers glossed as religion: visiting the pagoda, offering 
alms, practicing meditation. The distinction reflected a broader move amongst 
Pentecostals to disentangle religion from belief. This move was at odds with the 
definition offered in the conversion law, one that itself bears traces of past exchanges 
between Christianity and Buddhism. The logic of the law assumes a subject for whom 
religion is a matter of internal belief and individual choice. That internal belief and 
individual choice were paramount was a given for believers like May Lwin. But this 
is precisely what, for them, made religion moot, what took them beyond religion. This 
was what the state got wrong when it presumed it could assess a person’s belief and 
use it to register their religion. The dissonance between these understandings of 
religion was useful insofar as it allowed believers to avoid a potentially fraught 
encounter with the state’s attempt to manage religious difference. But the 
disentangling of religion and belief had not only practical but also theological 
entailments. It was what allowed evangelists to present Buddhism – the ‘tradition’ of 
May Lwin’s telling – as the religion par excellence.  
 
 
Transcending religion  
 
Evangelists in Myanmar were more likely to speak of ‘non-believers’ (ma youn chi 
thu) and ‘believers’ (youn chi thu) than ‘Buddhists’ (bok’da batha win) and 
‘Christians’ (cri’yan batha win). This was the case, for example, in the testimonies of 
‘new believers’ (youn chi thu athiq) printed in Hope’s church newsletter: ‘I used to be 
a non-believer’, was the usual formulation. It is of a piece with the distinction made 
by May Lwin, one that resonates with Galatians 3:28, a popular bible verse in Yangon 
churches: ‘There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male 
and female, for you are all one in Jesus Christ.’ Much preaching in Myanmar returns 
to this message. At the revival meeting at People’s Park, in the shadow of the 
Shwedagon Pagoda, one of the preachers, San Toe, explained to the thousands in 
attendance that Jesus died to counteract the ‘demerit’ (akutho) they inevitably 
accumulate through their actions, thoughts, and speech, whatever their ‘religion’ 
(batha). All religions are good, he explained, but they have the same message:  
 
Practice on your own. Try on your own. You’ll get it only if you do it. But 
you’re not good enough. So you go to hell (nga yeh). … That’s why Jesus 
came down to earth. This Jesus, he isn’t Christian. He’s a God that invites 
people of all races (lumyo), all religions (batha) … Jesus suffered for all of our 
demerit on the cross.  
 
Bamar or Chin, Buddhist or Christian, Jew or Gentile: San Toe’s framing works to 
render irrelevant the kind of distinctions that the state uses to organise difference. 
There is, once again, a pragmatic rationale behind the move. It is useful in a context 
where it remains dangerous to publically criticise Buddhism. To do so is to risk 
drawing the ire of those organisations that have tasked themselves with defending 
batha and thathana, and also poses the hazard of falling foul of a colonial-era law that 
prohibits insulting a religion – a crime that carries a possible two-year jail term.36 In 
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the face of that danger, evangelists stress that they are not interested in ‘comparing’ 
(hnain shin) different religions. But there is more to San Toe’s move than the desire 
to escape the attention of nationalists and the state. It also allowed evangelists such as 
him to present Buddhism as the quintessential religion, even as they avoided calling it 
by name. In the discourse of evangelism, ‘religion’ comes to stand for ‘Buddhism’. 
We will see how this played out in the way that evangelists spoke with Buddhist 
interlocutors. But first I want to consider the tracts often used by evangelists, and in 
which the positioning of Buddhism as religion can be clearly seen.  
 
‘The Drowning Man’ (ye niq thu) was a favourite in churches such as Hope. Few 
gospel trips were complete without evangelists distributing dozens of copies. It 
describes what happens to a man who dives into a lake, ignoring a nearby sign that 
clearly says ‘no swimming’. After he starts to drown, a bystander attempts to save 
him by standing on the shore and demonstrating how to swim: ‘You have to move 
your arms like this’. Another passer-by then admonishes the man: ‘Didn't you read the 
sign?!’ Finally, a third person dives in and saves him, saying, ‘Don't be scared, friend. 
I’m coming.’ It is, according to those who distribute the tract, a culturally sensitive 
rendering of the gospel that avoids mentioning either Buddhism or Christianity. The 
hope is that it prompts Buddhists to ask themselves the question that ultimately led 
May Lwin to Jesus. We know that our inability to follow rules and instructions leaves 
us drowning in samsara. Jesus is offering to dive in and rescue us. Why not accept 
him?  
 
I met the author of ‘The Drowning Man’ in June 2016 at his office close to Yangon’s 
airport. Born into a Buddhist family, he had converted to Christianity while attending 
university in the UK. He told me that when God gave him the vision to write the tract, 
it was with Buddhists specifically in mind. The challenge was how to do so without 
mentioning Buddhism. Drawing on his background, he wrote the story about the 
drowning man as a way to hone in on what he saw as the centrality of ‘law’ or taya in 
the practice of Burmese Buddhism. The pamphlet includes the line, ‘If you break the 
law, the law cannot save you.’ The point was to contrast this with the ‘grace’ (che zu 
daw) that comes through Jesus. Like other terms discussed in this paper, taya is not 
simple to define. It can refer to law, truth, and justice, and also the dhamma that the 
Buddha taught.37 It is thus central to what Matthew Walton refers to as an overarching 
‘moral universe’ organised around natural laws of cause-and-effect.38 Evangelism 
turns on the distinction between the law of karma that structures this universe and the 
grace that transcends it.39  
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In the tract, the former is represented in the figures of the first two people who 
approach the drowning man, offering instructions (‘You have to move your arms like 
this’) or reprimands (‘Didn't you read the sign?!’), but leaving him to bear the 
consequences of his actions. The latter is represented by the third figure, intervening 
directly to save the suffering man. This distinction animates the way evangelists 
attempted to engage their Buddhist interlocutors. Hope regularly sent teams of 
evangelists to areas throughout Yangon, often to townships like Shwepyitha and 
Hlaingthaya on the city’s fringe. Other churches had evangelism programs, but few 
matched Hope’s ambition, a manifestation of the vision God had given the senior 
pastor in the late 1980s. Teams were made up of staff, volunteers, and students 
enrolled in the church’s bible college, many of whom have travelled to Yangon from 
Chin State.  In September 2016, I accompanied a small group led by Suan, one the 
church’s evangelists, to Thaketa, an area east of the downtown. In her late twenties, 
Suan had served at the church since she was a teenager. She had previously been 
assigned to Thanlyin, a township over the other side of the Bago River. Equipped 
with stacks of pamphlets, the group walked through the neighbourhood asking 
residents if they had time to talk.  
 
The first person they spoke to that day was a 70-year-old woman. We sat on the floor 
of her house as she continued folding her laundry. A football match and recent rock 
concert featuring the band Iron Cross played on the TV in the background. Suan 
started by jotting down the woman’s name in a small notebook. She then said she 
would like to speak to the woman about what happens after we die. ‘As far as I 
understand it,’ Suan said, ‘in Burma, there’s something like religion (batha taya), 
right?’ She continued,  
 
People live under religion (batha taya). What it means is, ah, if you do good, 
you’ll get good (kaun da louq yin kaun da ya meh). … As to what religion is, 
it instructs us, right? Parents, for example, teach children not to curse, not to 
make noise, to treat adults well. … Now, people keep uposatha (Buddhist 
observance days), right? People go to pagodas, right? … Only by this, then, 
when one dies, they might arrive at somewhere good or arrive at somewhere 
not good, right? [But] one thing for sure is, it won’t get us to heaven. 
 
The formulation employed here – ‘If you do good, you’ll get good’ – is used in 
sermons by Buddhist monks in Myanmar. It refers to the accumulation of merit 
necessary to guarantee a good rebirth and eventual release from samsara. Evangelists 
like Suan take this causal logic to be the quintessence of religion. In preaching, the 
“old covenant” and the apparent premium it places on adherence to the law becomes a 
kind of shorthand for karma. To be ‘no longer under the law’ (Romans 6:14) might 
thus be to have one’s salvation no longer subject to its logic and the moral universe it 
organises. Suan’s point was that “religion” can teach us to live well but cannot rescue 
us from drowning. ‘We are trying to teach them that religion won’t save them,’ was 
how another evangelist put it. I noted above that this resonates with a familiar 




itself from its own conditions … judg[ing] itself no longer Christian, no longer 
religious.’40  
 
For evangelists like Suan, however, religion comes to index Buddhism specifically. 
Or rather, it indexes a partial and strategically useful image of Buddhism. This image 
of Buddhism – a system of cause and effect contingent on individual effort without 
recourse to the divine – elides the heterogeneity that constitutes actual Buddhist life in 
Myanmar and neighbouring countries.41 But it affords evangelists a stark counter 
against what they claim Jesus can offer. Recall San Toe’s characterisation: ‘Practice 
on your own … You’ll get it only if you do it.’ In other words, one thing that makes 
Buddhism a religion in the eyes of these Pentecostals is, in fact, its apparent secularity 
– insofar as it is reduced to the rationalistic and disenchanted functioning of a causal 
mechanism. The religious and the secular here get folded into the same field of action, 
against which Christ promises something other and transcendent.  
 
One irony is that it is this same image of Buddhism, with its emphasis on actions and 
consequences, shorn of superstition or intercession, which has led many to make 
claims about its compatibility with a secular view of the world.42 This is part of the 
subtle story Ruth Streicher tells in her contribution to this collection with respect to 
the writing of the Kitchanukit in nineteenth-century Siam. It is what has led some to 
claim – in an echo of what Pentecostals here suggest about their own faith but for 
almost the opposite reason – that Buddhism is not a religion.  This image emerges in 
part out of the same long conversation, between Buddhists and Christians, often under 
conditions of colonialism, which helped produce the definition of religion now found 
in Myanmar’s conversion law.43  
 
For evangelists, to live within the universe that this image presents – to sink or swim 
according to how well one can follow its laws – might be to live inside a version of 
what Charles Taylor calls the “immanent frame”: the disenchanted space of self-
reliant “buffered selves”, closed off from the transcendent, which he presents as a 
hallmark of a secular age. 44  There is not quite the accompanying “exclusive 
humanism” that appears in Taylor’s analysis. Suan and other evangelists work from 
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the assumption that their Buddhist interlocutors are, like them, deeply interested in 
otherworldly salvation. But in how evangelists present the gospel as a path toward 
this end, Buddhist selves get cast as buffered selves. The twist is that it is the buffered 
– or secular – state of these selves that makes them so religious.  
 
 
Conclusion: Definitional dissonance  
 
People are obsessed with religion, was how May Lwin put it. Scholars of Myanmar 
especially, we might add. Religion has been a central concern of researchers, 
especially anthropologists, since at least the 1960s.45 While non-Buddhist traditions 
have in recent years drawn increasing attention,46 scholars working on religion have 
more often adopted what Bénédicte Brac de la Perrière calls a ‘Buddhism-centric 
view’.47 The overwhelming focus on Theravada Buddhism serves, she writes, to not 
only re-enforce the centrality of Buddhism to Burmese narratives of national 
belonging, but also, through its focus on a set of apparently ‘orthodox’ practices, to 
elide the heterogeneity of Burmese Buddhism most visible in the nat spirit cult.48 A 
second irony: The result of this ‘Buddhism-centric view’ is an echo of the move made 
by the evangelists discussed here: religion in Myanmar comes to mean not just 
Buddhism, but a particular version of it.  
 
In this paper I have tracked some of the work performed by the category of religion 
over the course of a long conversation between Buddhism and Christianity. In doing 
so I have responded to recent calls to consider how it and other key terms get defined 
and deployed in and about Myanmar, helping to unsettle some of the conceptual 
grammar on which analysis of recent events is often grounded. A caveat is in order: 
To question this grammar is not to reject the claim this analysis is frequently used to 
make – that is, that greater state neutrality, with respect to Buddhism, Islam, and 
Christianity, would improve the situation for Myanmar’s minorities. As I was revising 
this paper in early 2020, David Lah, one of the preachers at the People’s Park event, 
was arrested and put on trial. The charge was that he had allegedly held worship 
services in the Yangon township of Insein in defiance of social distancing restrictions 
in place to fight the coronavirus pandemic.49 While many Christians were ambivalent 
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about the case, some saw it as the playing out of a familiar pattern of discrimination, 
pointing to Buddhist events that had apparently gone ahead under lockdown without 
arrests being made. It is against this backdrop that the definitional dissonance 
discussed here becomes productive, not just in providing the conceptual scaffolding 
for evangelism, but also in helping believers evade the gaze of the state and its efforts 
to regulate religious difference.       
 
Responding to the activities of Christian missionaries during the colonial period, the 
monk Ledi Sayadaw and others came to speak of ‘Buddhists’ and  
‘Christians’: followers of religions defined as comparable systems of belief. We have 
seen that the Pentecostals discussed here were less keen on these terms, preferring to 
speak of ‘non-believers’ and ‘believers’, the latter denoting a person whose salvation 
is no longer dependent on a karmic logic that is, in their eyes, both deeply religious 
and deeply secular. The path from Adoniram Judson to Ledi Sayadaw to today’s 
conversion law contains a series of dissonances, slippages where the categories of 
religion and belief come together and fall apart again: where, for state law, religion 
comes to mean belief; where, for the evangelists, religion comes to mean Buddhism; 
and also where, in a clear reminder of the limitations and ambiguities of such 
categories, those sharing the gospel appear to position themselves in opposition to 
both religiosity and secularity. Such moments of dissonance become most audible at 
moments when the state’s regulation of religion appears to stumble. When, for 
example, the colonial state in Burma in the late nineteenth century tried to engage 
Buddhist monastic schools in its education program – and in doing so attempted to 
circumscribe the boundaries of ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ subjects – many monks 
refused to participate.50 ‘The monks were not interested in participating in the creation 
of Buddhism as a religion because this did not serve their ends,’ which, in their case, 
was the protection and promotion of the thathana.51  
 
Something similar could be said of the evangelists here and their evasion of state 
attempts to regulate religion in the form of registration cards and a conversion law. If 
salvation depends only on belief, it has nothing to do with these state projects, even as 
these same projects have come to define religion in terms of belief. As with the 
encounter between the Tswana and British missionaries, this is a long conversation 
that brings into dialogue ‘divergent cultural perspectives, dissimilar intentions, 
dissonant notions of value’.52 But we have seen in this paper how the persistence of 
definitional dissonance allows interlocutors to operate at cross-purposes. This is not to 
deny that relations between religions in Myanmar have and continue to be deeply 
unequal, often violently so, as recent years have confirmed with shocking clarity. It is, 
rather, to show how they have not everywhere and always been unequal in the same 
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sort of way. What the Comaroffs term the ‘colonisation of consciousness’ is difficult 
to parse in a conversation that has and continues to be punctuated by so many 
inversions pivoting around religion.  
 
‘More successful anthropological approaches to religion,’ suggests Michael Lambek, 
‘begin with acts of making and doing rather than in the articulation of personal 
experience or beliefs … From this perspective, belief and experience are secondary 
phenomena when it comes to discerning, distinguishing (or, for that matter, 
explaining) religion ... ’.53 In making this claim, Lambek picks up on anthropology’s 
recent reflection on its own Christian inheritance, particularly the way the discipline 
had once assumed a definition of religion inflected by a Protestant emphasis on 
individual belief – an assumption now subject of extensive critique. A third irony: 
The Pentecostals discussed here would be quick to endorse Lambek’s claim. Indeed, 
whenever I introduced myself to one of them by saying I was interested in studying 
‘religion’, they told me I was going about it in a rather odd fashion. Shouldn’t I be 
spending my time with Buddhists, which is to say with people actually practising 
religion? If I insisted instead on hanging out with them, I might struggle to learn 
much about the topic because it wasn’t something in which they had much interest.  
 
Not that they had much interest in secularism either, if by that we mean, not only the 
state management of religion that Mahmood and others have shown its forms of 
governance entail, but also the settlement it’s generally taken to denote: one that 
mandates the retreat of faith from a public to a private sphere. Quite the contrary, 
especially if the enthusiasm of those celebrating new freedoms to preach publically in 
People’s Park and elsewhere is any indication. What becomes clear, rather, is an 
ongoing reworking of the conceptual ground on which a secular settlement might 
depend – a reworking that has played out, in part, through the course of the Buddhist-
Christian encounter and continues into the present. The evangelists here remind us 
that if their exchanges with Buddhists are part of a long conversation, it’s one with so 
many slippages that the interlocutors often appear to be speaking past each other. But 
they also invite us to attune to these dissonances, listening not just for reverberations 
of colonial and postcolonial histories, but also for the gaps from which might emerge 
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